From Phil Stenholm:
Another installment about History of Evanston Fire Department
FOSTER, TRAINING, AND FIRE PREVENTION
A fire was reported at the Foster Elementary School at 2010 Dewey Avenue in the early-evening hours of Tuesday, October 28, 1958. Engine Co. 23 arrived first and led-out a 1-1/2 inch pre-connect. Engine 25 provided a supply line for Engine 23 and also laid a dry 2-1/2 inch line as a back-up, before grabbing a hydrant. Engine Co. 25 pulled another 1-1/2 inch pre-connect off Engine 23, and Truck Co. 23 assisted the engine companies locating the seat of the blaze. Cross-trained police officers assisted with positioning ladders to the second floor and dragging hose lines, and prepared to man Engine 25’s back-up 2-1/2 inch hand-line.
The fire was located in the attic in the school’s older section, and crews from Engine 23, Engine 25, and Truck 23 unsuccessfully attacked the fire from below. A second alarm was ordered by F-2, followed quickly by a third alarm. Engine 21, Truck 21, and Squad 21 (driven by the mechanic) responded on the second alarm, and Engine 24 and Truck 22 responded on the third alarm. Engine 22 transferred (changed quarters) to Station # 1.
Engine 21 and Truck 21 pulled into the west alley, and Engine 24 laid a supply line for Engine 21 and a dry 2-1/2 inch line as a back-up, before taking a hydrant. Crews from Engine Co. 21 and Engine Co. 24 pulled hand lines off Engine 21 on the west side (rear) of the school. Truck Co. 22 assisted Engine 21 and Engine 24 and did some salvage work. Truck 21’s main was extended to the roof immediately upon arrival, and the company initiated vertical ventilation.
Dewey Avenue was a through-street at that time, so Squad 21 was parked on Dewey north of Foster, with the mechanic preparing the squad’s four “night sun” floodlights for operation. Chief Geishecker (F-1) arrived from home and immediately ordered a full Code 10 (call-back of both of the off-duty platoons). As soon as the first reserve engine was placed in service, Engine Co. 22 was ordered to the fire to supply an elevated master stream atop Truck 21 on the west side of the school. Squad 22 was driven to the scene in case its high-pressure turret was needed.
Ultimately, all three reserve engines were placed into service. Two of the pumpers were sent to Station # 1 to provide coverage for the rest of the city, while Engine 27 (ex-E23) responded to the fire directly from Station # 3 and supplied Truck 23’s elevated master stream on the east side of the school. Additional firemen arriving from home were picked-up at their respective stations and shuttled to the scene in the CD pick-up truck. About 90 men were eventually put to work at the fire, allowing crews to rotate periodically.
The flames had gained considerable headway by the time Chief Geishecker arrived, and not wanting to see a repeat of the Boltwood School fire debacle of 1927, he requested mutual aid from the Chicago Fire Department. Something may have been lost in the translation, however, because six Chicago FD engine companies and the Chicago Civil Defense Fire & Rescue Service were dispatched, only to find out once they arrived that they were requested as a precaution, and actually weren’t immediately needed. The Chicago FD companies returned to quarters, but the CCDFRS crews remained on the scene for a while.
Foster School sustained significant fire damage to its roof and attic, some fire and smoke damage on the second floor, and extensive water damage on the first and second floors and basement, but it was not destroyed. This was NOT another Boltwood School fire! Students were temporarily transferred to other Evanston elementary schools for the balance of the school year, but the damage was repaired in time for the start of school the following September. However, the $325,000 loss resulting from this blaze was the second-highest dollar-loss resulting from a fire in Evanston’s history up to that point in time, second only to the Northwestern University Technological Institute fire in 1940.
The Foster School fire was the last time the Chicago FD responded on a mutual-aid mission into Evanston. The EFD would henceforth call upon suburban fire departments – usually Wilmette and/or Skokie — when assistance was needed, as the Wilmette FD became a 100% professional fire department in 1958, and new Skokie FD Chief Raymond Redick came over from the Chicago Fire Insurance Patrol in 1959 and transformed what had been a somewhat disorganized outfit into a first-rate fire department. The Skokie Civil Defense Fire & Rescue corps (using the radio call-sign “Squad 26” when responding into Evanston) provided valuable manpower and fireground support at many Evanston fires post-1959 as well.
While the Chicago Fire Department did not respond into Evanston again after the Foster School fire, the Chicago Civil Defense Fire & Rescue Service did respond into Evanston one more time, in September 1959, after a number of trees were blown down in a late-night microburst that also knocked-out power across the city. Three squads from the CCDFRS assisted the EFD throughout the night and into the next morning, using winches and chain saws to remove and then cut-up dozens of downed trees that were blocking Evanston streets.
The EFD’s Training Bureau was officially established on November 1, 1958, three days after the Foster School fire. Capt. Willard Thiel was appointed the first “training officer.” Previously, each platoon had its own drillmaster who was responsible for supervising the training of members of that platoon, but Capt. Thiel would be responsible for training all three platoons, as well as police officers. The Training Bureau was based at Station # 1, and besides being in charge of training, Capt. Thiel also was responsible for supervising the EFD repair shop and the fire equipment mechanics.
Creating the training officer position and transferring the fire equipment mechanics to the Training Bureau cut maximum shift staffing on each platoon from 32 to 31 and minimum shift staffing from 29 to 28, as Engine 21 was no longer staffed with a four-man crew each shift. Truck Co. 21 (the “high-value district” truck) still operated at all times with four men, but the other seven companies were usually staffed with three men. The three extra men on each shift were assigned to Engine 21, Truck 22, and/or Engine 25 when they weren’t covering for a fireman absent due to vacation, sick call, or a work-related injury, but it was rare when one of the extra men was actually available to ride as the fourth man on a rig.
In addition to the establishment of the Training Bureau, the EFD’s Fire Prevention Bureau was upgraded in 1958, as captains replaced firemen as FPB inspectors, and a civilian clerk-typist / administrative assistant was hired (Catherine Leahy the first year, then Margaret Wood, and then Eleanor Franzen). Capt. Ed Fahrbach was promoted to assistant chief and replaced Chief Geishecker as a platoon commander, and firemen John Becker, George Croll, George Neuhaus, and Lou Peters were promoted to captain.
The fire was located in the attic in the school’s older section, and crews from Engine 23, Engine 25, and Truck 23 unsuccessfully attacked the fire from below. A second alarm was ordered by F-2, followed quickly by a third alarm. Engine 21, Truck 21, and Squad 21 (driven by the mechanic) responded on the second alarm, and Engine 24 and Truck 22 responded on the third alarm. Engine 22 transferred (changed quarters) to Station # 1.
Engine 21 and Truck 21 pulled into the west alley, and Engine 24 laid a supply line for Engine 21 and a dry 2-1/2 inch line as a back-up, before taking a hydrant. Crews from Engine Co. 21 and Engine Co. 24 pulled hand lines off Engine 21 on the west side (rear) of the school. Truck Co. 22 assisted Engine 21 and Engine 24 and did some salvage work. Truck 21’s main was extended to the roof immediately upon arrival, and the company initiated vertical ventilation.
Dewey Avenue was a through-street at that time, so Squad 21 was parked on Dewey north of Foster, with the mechanic preparing the squad’s four “night sun” floodlights for operation. Chief Geishecker (F-1) arrived from home and immediately ordered a full Code 10 (call-back of both of the off-duty platoons). As soon as the first reserve engine was placed in service, Engine Co. 22 was ordered to the fire to supply an elevated master stream atop Truck 21 on the west side of the school. Squad 22 was driven to the scene in case its high-pressure turret was needed.
Ultimately, all three reserve engines were placed into service. Two of the pumpers were sent to Station # 1 to provide coverage for the rest of the city, while Engine 27 (ex-E23) responded to the fire directly from Station # 3 and supplied Truck 23’s elevated master stream on the east side of the school. Additional firemen arriving from home were picked-up at their respective stations and shuttled to the scene in the CD pick-up truck. About 90 men were eventually put to work at the fire, allowing crews to rotate periodically.
The flames had gained considerable headway by the time Chief Geishecker arrived, and not wanting to see a repeat of the Boltwood School fire debacle of 1927, he requested mutual aid from the Chicago Fire Department. Something may have been lost in the translation, however, because six Chicago FD engine companies and the Chicago Civil Defense Fire & Rescue Service were dispatched, only to find out once they arrived that they were requested as a precaution, and actually weren’t immediately needed. The Chicago FD companies returned to quarters, but the CCDFRS crews remained on the scene for a while.
Foster School sustained significant fire damage to its roof and attic, some fire and smoke damage on the second floor, and extensive water damage on the first and second floors and basement, but it was not destroyed. This was NOT another Boltwood School fire! Students were temporarily transferred to other Evanston elementary schools for the balance of the school year, but the damage was repaired in time for the start of school the following September. However, the $325,000 loss resulting from this blaze was the second-highest dollar-loss resulting from a fire in Evanston’s history up to that point in time, second only to the Northwestern University Technological Institute fire in 1940.
The Foster School fire was the last time the Chicago FD responded on a mutual-aid mission into Evanston. The EFD would henceforth call upon suburban fire departments – usually Wilmette and/or Skokie — when assistance was needed, as the Wilmette FD became a 100% professional fire department in 1958, and new Skokie FD Chief Raymond Redick came over from the Chicago Fire Insurance Patrol in 1959 and transformed what had been a somewhat disorganized outfit into a first-rate fire department. The Skokie Civil Defense Fire & Rescue corps (using the radio call-sign “Squad 26” when responding into Evanston) provided valuable manpower and fireground support at many Evanston fires post-1959 as well.
While the Chicago Fire Department did not respond into Evanston again after the Foster School fire, the Chicago Civil Defense Fire & Rescue Service did respond into Evanston one more time, in September 1959, after a number of trees were blown down in a late-night microburst that also knocked-out power across the city. Three squads from the CCDFRS assisted the EFD throughout the night and into the next morning, using winches and chain saws to remove and then cut-up dozens of downed trees that were blocking Evanston streets.
The EFD’s Training Bureau was officially established on November 1, 1958, three days after the Foster School fire. Capt. Willard Thiel was appointed the first “training officer.” Previously, each platoon had its own drillmaster who was responsible for supervising the training of members of that platoon, but Capt. Thiel would be responsible for training all three platoons, as well as police officers. The Training Bureau was based at Station # 1, and besides being in charge of training, Capt. Thiel also was responsible for supervising the EFD repair shop and the fire equipment mechanics.
Creating the training officer position and transferring the fire equipment mechanics to the Training Bureau cut maximum shift staffing on each platoon from 32 to 31 and minimum shift staffing from 29 to 28, as Engine 21 was no longer staffed with a four-man crew each shift. Truck Co. 21 (the “high-value district” truck) still operated at all times with four men, but the other seven companies were usually staffed with three men. The three extra men on each shift were assigned to Engine 21, Truck 22, and/or Engine 25 when they weren’t covering for a fireman absent due to vacation, sick call, or a work-related injury, but it was rare when one of the extra men was actually available to ride as the fourth man on a rig.
In addition to the establishment of the Training Bureau, the EFD’s Fire Prevention Bureau was upgraded in 1958, as captains replaced firemen as FPB inspectors, and a civilian clerk-typist / administrative assistant was hired (Catherine Leahy the first year, then Margaret Wood, and then Eleanor Franzen). Capt. Ed Fahrbach was promoted to assistant chief and replaced Chief Geishecker as a platoon commander, and firemen John Becker, George Croll, George Neuhaus, and Lou Peters were promoted to captain.
#1 by LT/PM Wayne Kinzie on February 12, 2022 - 11:31 PM
I remember being detailed to Eng. 79 a few times 6 or 7 years ago and at the joker stand they had a couple of mabas alarm box cards that had 79 responding on a 4 or 5-11. I forgot what suburb it was but I haven’t seen a general order to rescind it.
But oddly enough I never saw this at Eng11
#2 by Crabbymilton on February 11, 2022 - 1:56 PM
Thanks for the clarification Mike L. Here in Milwaukee, I know of a MFD station that is closer to Tosa than Wauwatosa’s own stations. But it took quite a bit to get MFD to respond. Now of course things are different where virtually all of Milwaukee County and part of eastern Waukesha all respond when and where needed. Pretty much bypasses MABAS for lessor calls and med calls.
#3 by Mike L on February 11, 2022 - 1:35 PM
Crabby, with the exception of the CFD squads being on many suburban box cards, no CFD engines or trucks respond out unless special called to bring the MVUs (9-2-3 w/ E106 or 9-2-4 w/ E9), the deluge rigs (6-7-3 w/ E108 or 6-7-6 w/ E104), Eng 2 (or E58 if E2 is OOS) if a fireboat is needed, or for a hose wagon (6-1-2 w/ E26 or 6-1-1 w/ E81) or for the foam task force out of ORD. Also, any time the CFD responds out of town, a BC has to go with. Depending on the incident, a DDC or higher may also respond as well. It’s not because they hate each other. In fact, there are many times the CFD and border suburbs work together if either one gets a call for an incident on or very close to the border.
#4 by Phil Stenholm on February 11, 2022 - 1:35 PM
When I was dispatching there in the 1980’s, many of the Evanston Fire Department chiefs who were there at that time were averse to pulling a MABAS box, even for a major fire. They would readily request mutual aid from Skokie (normally a truck) and Wilmette (usually an engine), but not through MABAS. And they would even order a call-back of off-duty firefighters before they would pull a MABAS box!
One of the reasons was that the EFD chiefs did not want to cede dispatching and communications control to another agency, and also there was supposedly an understanding between the union and the chiefs after the 1974 strike that MABAS would not be used to circumvent the calling back of off-duty firefighters.
I personally believed at the time that at least some of the older EFD chiefs just didn’t understand MABAS. One of the chiefs said he didn’t know what fire departments were due to respond into Evanston on a MABAS box, and he didn’t care.
However, the Evanston Fire Department did readily respond – TO – MABAS box alarms back then, probably because they were required to respond. The only problem was back at that time MABAS required four-man crews on engines and trucks responding to a MABAS box, and the Evanston Fire Department was running all three-man engines and trucks, so the EFD would have to take an additional engine or truck company out of service to staff the company going on the MABAS run with four firefighters.
For example, I remember one time Engine 21 responded on a MABAS box, and the third firefighter from Truck 21 jumped onto Engine 21 so that Engine 21 could respond with a four-man crew. Then the two remaining members of Truck 21 staffed Ambulance 3 (Truck Co. 21 was a “jump company” back then and staffed the EFD’s third ambulance, but usually only when needed), and Truck Co. 22 and Engine Co. 23 changed quarters to Station # 1.
Another time, I remember Truck 22 responded on a MABAS box, and the third man from Engine 22 was assigned to Truck 22 so that Truck 22 could respond with a four-man crew, and then Engine 22 transferred to Station # 1 and Engine 22’s two remaining firefighters manned Squad 21 (which was normally not manned).
So it varied from incident to incident, depending on who was in charge. They just kind of “winged it.”
Of course, that was 35 or 40 years ago, so MABAS may have changed the engine and truck company staffing rules since then.
#5 by crabbymilton on February 11, 2022 - 12:57 PM
I stand corrected I was looking at a bad map. Then they must just hate each other.
#6 by Phil Stenholm on February 11, 2022 - 12:43 PM
CRABBY MILTON: CFD Engine Co. 102, Truck Co. 25, and Ambulance 56 are located only a half-mile south of the Evanston-Chicago border, Engine Co. 70, Engine Co. 59, Truck Co. 47, Ambulance 13, Battalion 9, and Engine Co. 71 are all located about 1-1/2 miles south of the border, and Evanston Station # 22 (engine company, truck company, and an ambulance) and Station # 24 (engine company) are located less than a mile north of the border, so proximity and geography isn’t the problem.
#7 by crabbymilton on February 11, 2022 - 11:50 AM
If I had to make a guess, since CFD is part of MABAS, they would be on the “list” but more toward the bottom since it’s quite a bit north. The days of having to burn the apparatus tires if they ever touched the soil of another municipality are pretty much gone. Now it seems to depend on geography regardless of borders plus many have shared service agreements.
#8 by Phil Stenholm on February 11, 2022 - 11:30 AM
MICHAEL M: Truck 23 was taken out of front-line service and its manpower was transferred to Squad 21 on January 1, 1963, as the EFD cut back from three truck companies to two (Truck 21 at Station # 1 and Truck 22 at Station # 2, with the district boundary between the two trucks being Dempster Street). Truck 23 averaged only about two runs per week in 1962, so it was kind of difficult for Chief Geishecker to justify running three truck companies.
Just as it was from April 1, 1955 to April 1, 1957 (when it ran as a company), Squad 21 was the busiest company in the EFD 1963-76. It was sort of the SS-1 of the EFD during those years, not because it had a snorkel (it did not), but because it was seemingly everywhere. Squad 21 responded to inhalator calls, minor fires, and engine-type details in Station # 1’s district, and all fire calls and specialized rescues city-wide.
Squad 21 was taken out of front-line service in 1977 to provide manpower for the second MICU ambulance, and whenever possible it was staffed with two paramedic firefighters (the jump crew for Ambulance 3) up until the 26-man minimum shift staffing was established by CBA contract in 1980, at which point Squad 21 became an unmanned ready-reserve rig, and Truck 21 became the jump company for Ambulance 3.
Truck 21 and Ambulance 3 (Ambulance 23) were relocated to Station # 3 in 1990, and Truck 21 was re-designated Truck 23 at that time. So Truck 23 is really still Truck 21, it just has a different number.
#9 by Michael m on February 11, 2022 - 6:59 AM
Interesting how even in the late 50’s departments started putting 3 men on each vehicle. When did they finally take Truck 21 out of service as a manned company?
I am also surprised that they made Squad 21 a jump company in the 1950’s as well.
#10 by Dan on February 11, 2022 - 4:14 AM
Is it true today that Chicago won’t go into Evanston?