Lengthy video from Thursday night’s house fire in Prospect Heights.
A gallery of photos is HERE.
This from Prospect Heights Deputy Chief Drew Smith (901) who worked as the interior chief at the fire:
Fire confined to second floor bedroom walk-in closet and office area. Closet was large enough to be its own room and office area was attached to walk-in closet. Multiple peaks of roof and vaulted and cathedral ceilings required extensive overhaul to check for fire spread. A total of five 1&3/4 hose lines were deployed:
Line 1 fire area inside closet
Line 2 fire area outside closet
Line 3 cover balance of second floor while ceiling opened to check for fire spread
Line 4 covered base of stair
Line 5 was used exterior
Terrain and a small stream to the west of this area made access to nearby Wheeling hydrants impractical. Long-distance LDH relay used. Normally, E9 would be attack pumper and E39 would start relay with a mutual-aid company extending the lay if necessary. Since AH E4 arrived first Squad 9 dropped its full bed then E39 finished the lay and pumped. We have a procedure for this, have used it many times, and it allowed us to obtain an ISO Class 3 even in our non-hydranted areas.
Due to the location of the house in relationship to the cul-de-sac (which has an island) and that the first engine and tankers could only get so far out of the way, Tower 12 could only access the roof at the A-B corner. Had there been much fire in the attic and roof areas we may have had a hard time with suppression.
This is the Box card (as actually filled).
Diagram of fire scene.
#1 by Tyler Tobolt on November 26, 2013 - 7:54 AM
If i’m not mistaking Buffalo Grove Tower 25 was on another run at the time But i could be wrong.
#2 by Drew Smith on November 25, 2013 - 9:18 PM
Ideally, a report of a fire in a building (not an “I smell something”) would receive a four engine, two truck, one squad, EMS, and chiefs plus tankers if non-hydranted. To achieve this most suburban FDs would need half or more of the apparatus to be from a mutual/automatic-aid department. The deployment of such resources on a report only is not widely accepted by many chiefs at this time. Within a large portion of MABAS Divisions 1 and 3, the Code 3 is used for the reported fire and the Code 4 for the working fire. For many of these FDs the Code 4 will get them a response that looks something like the above 4-2-1 response. That is what we try to get in PH. We also rely on RED Center’s professional judgment. If RED has determined there is a high probability of a working fire (multiple calls, police on the scene, caller details, AFA/water flow alarm followed by 9-1-1 call, etc.) then they are empowered to raise the alarm to the Code 4.
As for the E23 versus E4 and T25 versus T12 there are no politics involved, just many years of past practice which sometimes needs revision. As with all box alarms we review the card to see how things can be improved for the next incident.
#3 by Scott on November 25, 2013 - 7:12 PM
Bill, there is far more than just a “mutual aide agreement”… the politics involved are as great in the suburbs as the City! Sometimes worse (not that is the case for PHTS). Also, except for a very few MABAS Div’s, trucks do not change quarters in Div 1 & 3. As far as Wheeling, they can’t send two rigs to another town on the initial alarm, who would be left covering Wheeling? This is where a choice needs to be made for tactical advantage as well as the consideration of not stripping another town. Also, for MABAS, all Box cards are sent to towns do in draft form at least 30days in advance for a town that is due to reply if they can or can not meet the response requested. A town has the right to say they can not meet the request before the card is finalized.
#4 by Bill Post on November 24, 2013 - 11:59 PM
This detailed coverage of the fire in Prospect Heights that Larry and Drew provided is excellent coverage in showing and explaining what had to be done to get and establish a water supply to the fire and the logistical challenge that had to be gone through in order to attack and extinguish the fire.
This also illustrated a need for a mutual aide response revision that is needed for that particular area. While Arlington Heights Engine 4 was correctly dispatched to the scene as they were nearer then Prospect Heights companies. It also would of made sense to have Wheeling Engine 23 respond on the initial dispatch as they were the closest station to the scene of the incident and it would have also made sense to have Buffalo Grove Tower Ladder 25 first due Truck on the Code 4 instead of on the box as they were also a shorter distance to the scene of the fire then Northbrook Tower Ladder 12 was.
I understand that because there were no hydrants in the vicinity of the fire that Tanker 9 was correctly dispatched to scene as opposed to dispatching Tower Ladder 9 however Tower Ladder 25 (from Buffalo Grove) is about the same distance away (about 2 and a half miles) yet Northbrook Tower Ladder 12 was dispatched from nearly 8 miles away before Tower Ladder 25 was sent. While Tower Ladder 25 could have been on another run I have a hunch that this was part of the mutual aide agreement that tries not send too may companies from nearby towns at once.
The response system however would make more sense if they were to have dispatched Tower 25 on the Code 4 and have Tower 12 change quarters to Tower 25 (like they do in Chicago and in most big city fire departments). If Tower 25 wasn’t available for the Code 4 then Wheeling Tower 24 would have been the next closest Tower Ladder to the scene.
Operationally the crews did a great job of stopping and extinguishing the fire but the policy of sending the Northbrook Tower before the Buffalo Grove Tower should be changed.